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I. INTRODUCTION
Structuring? What is that anyway? Well one might consider the
structuring scandal behind Dennis Hastert, former speaker of the United
States House of Representatives.2 Mr. Hastert’s former student accused
him of sexual harassment during Mr. Hastert’s tenure at the accuser’s high
school.3 Mr. Hastert, the longest-serving Republican speaker of the House
of Representatives was charged with making cash withdrawals in a manner
intended to avoid detection by bank officials, a crime known as
structuring.4 The evidence against the former speaker indicated that he
withdrew cash in $50,000 increments from several accounts to pay off the
former student every six weeks for years.5
After bank officials questioned Mr. Hastert about his actions, he then
structured his withdrawals to amounts less than $10,000 in attempt to
remain undetected.6 Mr. Hastert made 106 smaller withdrawals all under
$10,000 and totaling $952,000 over the years he paid off his accuser.7
Though federal prosecutors never charged Mr. Hastert with the underlying
offense of sexual abuse, prosecutors charged Mr. Hastert with structuring
2
Conor Friedersdorf, Why Is It a Crime to Evade Government Scrutiny?, ATLANTIC
(Jun. 2. 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/when-evadinggovernment-spying-is-a-crime/394640/
3
Id.
4
Julie Bosman, Details About the Indictment of Dennis Hastert, N.Y. TIMES (June 9.
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/10/us/the-case-against-dennis-hastert.html
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
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his funds to evade detection.8
The anti-structuring provisions under 31 U.S.C. § 5324 are a product
of the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 (“MLCA”), an amendment
to the Banking Secrecy Act.9 The MLCA resolved the disputes amongst
circuit courts including between the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
which held that a defendant who purchased several cashier’s checks
totaling over $100,000 in cash to conceal the true origins of the funds was
guilty of structing, but the First Circuit Court of Appeals failed to find a
defendant who purchased twelve checks, all of which aggregated to more
than $100,000 but none of which exceeded $10,000 guilty. 10 The MLCA
statute—primarily aimed at curbing money laundering—mandated
financial institutions to file currency transaction reports (“CTRS”) for
transactions over $10,000.11 After the MLCA passed in 1986, there were a
number of successful enforcement actions.12 Additionally, there were
several amendments made to the statute, but most were technical and nonsubstantive.13 For example, in 1992 Congress amended the statute adding
sub-section 5324(b) which criminalized a failure to file currency and
monetary instruments reports (“CMIR”).14
Technical issues in the MLCA’s enactment and issues pertaining to
the criminality a defendant must possess both plagued the money
laundering statute.15 Among the issues that led to the 1994 amendment was
the meaning of the word “willfully” within § 5324.16 Ratzlaf v. United
States17 was the case that squarely placed this issue before the Supreme
Court.
At issue in that case was whether a heightened proof of knowledge
was required to charge defendants.18 Specifically, whether the defendant

8
David Post, Anti-Structuring in the news!, WASH. POST. June 10. 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/06/10/anti-structuringin-the-news/?utm_term=.7c04bf19cb80.
9
Courtney J. Linn, Redefining the Bank Secrecy Act: Currency Transaction
Reporting and the Crime of Structuring, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 407, 440 (2010).
10
Compare United States v. Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d 1092, 1099 (11th Cir. 1983) with
United States v. Anzalone, 766 F.2d 676, 678-681 (1st Cir. 1985).
11
Money Laundering Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (1986).
12
COMPTROLLER GEN., U.S. GEN ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS: BANK
SECRECY ACT REPORTING REQUIREMENTS HAVE NOT YET MET EXPECTATIONS, SUGGESTING
NEED FOR AMENDMENT 23-25 (1981).
13
Linn, supra note 9, at 440.
14
See United States v. One 1985 Mercedes-Benz, 14 F.3d 465, 467 & n.4 (9th Cir.
1994) (discussing the legislative changes to the Money Laundering Control Act).
15
Linn, supra note 9, at 444.
16
Linn, supra note 9, at 444.
17
Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994).
18
Linn, supra note 9, at 443.
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knew their conduct brought them within the purview of the statute and
whether the defendant also knew their conduct is criminal.19 The TobonBuiles and Anzalone circuit split was the catalyst for the 1994 Ratzlaf
decision.20 The Supreme Court in Ratzlaf held that “willfully” meant that
the defendant needed knowledge of both the wrongful conduct and
knowledge that the conduct was criminal to violate the structuring
provision.21 In repudiating the Court’s holding, Congress immediately
amended the statute by deleting the statute’s use of the phrase “willfully”
for all criminal prosecutions asserted under the statute, thereby eliminating
the requirement that the defendant know the conduct was a crime.22
The Ratzlaf decision and Congress’ willingness to amend the statute
ties in with another potential issue with the current statute. Specifically,
there is a trend in some cases whereby prosecutors are charging defendants
even though they do not have the requisite minimum cash requirement. In
the specific context of money laundering, defense attorneys sometimes
assert the “cash hoard defense,” arguing that the defendant lacked the
requisite minimum funds.23 This defense, commonly used by tax crime
attorneys, argues that the defendant at no point had the minimum cash
requirement on hand during the commission of the crime, therefore the
defendant cannot be guilty as charged.24 In Ratzlaf, the defendant did have
a cash hoard of $160,000 dollars which he broke into smaller chunks, but in
subsequent decisions from circuit courts the defendants did not.25
Some circuit courts have had defendant assert the cash hoard defense
unsuccessfully. For example, years after Ratzlaf, defendants from the
Seventh and Eighth Circuits argued they were not guilty of the structuring
statute because they never had the relevant “cash hoard” necessary. In
United States v. Van Allen26 and United States v. Sweeney27 the Seventh
and Eighth Circuits respectively rejected the defendant’s cash hoard
defense. These cases are important because they provide key context on
19

Linn, supra note 9, at 443.
Id. at 445.
21
Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 142.
22
See Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-325, Sec. 411, 108 Stat. 2160, 2253 (amending Section 5324 to include its
own criminal penalty provision, now codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5324(c)).
23
Blanch Law Firm, Cash Hoard Defense, (2012), http://taxcrimefirm.com/defensesto-tax-evasion/cash-hoard-defense/
24
Id.
25
Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 137 (discussing that defendant Ratzlaf had $160,000 in debt
from playing blackjack at a casino that Ratzlaf “purchased cashier’s checks, each for less
than $10,000” from different banks that Ratzlaf used to pay the casino and evade the bank’s
obligation to report cash transactions exceeding $10,000).
26
See United States v. Van Allen, 524 F.3d 814, 820 (7th Cir. 2008).
27
See United States v. Sweeney, 611 F.3d 459, 472 (8th Cir. 2010).
20
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what the cash hoard defense is and why its uses were unsuccessful in the
cases that follow.
A few years after the Seventh and Eighth Circuit decisions, the
defendant in United States v. Sperrazza from the Eleventh Circuit made a
more persuasive cash hoard defense argument which was ultimately
rejected.28 In Sperrazza, the court held that the “government may properly
charge a defendant with structuring a transaction” even though the
defendant did not have the requisite $10,000 in hand at any time.29
Arguably more important is the dissenting opinion, which argues a
defendant needs to have the minimum cash requirement before they can be
charged and prosecuted under the structuring law because the dissent is
consistent with principles of statutory interpretation and the legislative
intent.30
An implication of Sperrazza and other subsequent courts’ decisions
plays out in a few ways. First, take for example a restaurant owner who
goes to the bank every week to deposit approximately $9,000 dollars to
avoid carrying copious amounts of cash and avoid robbers.31 Are they
guilty of a crime? How about a bartender who makes about $2,000-$2,500
a week in tips but never over $10,000 in a month? The bartender deposits
roughly $9,500 every month into a bank account, with no knowledge a
crime is being committed.32 Are they guilty of crime? If we accept the
Sperrazza decision, both of these individuals could be guilty of a crime
based on their pattern of conduct, though neither possessed greater than the
requisite $10,000.33 The United States v. Sperrazza interpretation of
section 5324—which disregards a fundamental requirement of the
minimum cash of $10,000 a defendant must possess—could lead to a host
of innocent people being prosecuted. In other words, prosecutors should
not solely rely on a pattern of transactions to charge and prosecute

28

United States v. Sperrazza, 804 F.3d 1113 (11th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 1125.
30
Id. at 1129.
31
Id. at 1124 (discussing two hypothetical defendants with the first most likely guilty
of structuring and the second innocent. “First, consider a defendant who has checks totaling
$18,000 but decides to cash $9,000 today and $9,000 tomorrow in order to avoid the
reporting requirement; there can be no question the defendant may be charged with one
count of structuring in violation. Second, consider the defendant who has checks totaling
$9,000 and knows he will receive another bundle of checks totaling more than $1,000
tomorrow; in order to avoid the reporting requirement, he decides to cash the checks totaling
$9,000 today.”).
32
Radley Balko, The federal ‘structuring’ laws are smurfin’ ridiculous, THE
WASHINGTON POST (March. 24, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thewatch/wp/2014/03/24/the-federal-structuring-laws-are-smurfinridiculous/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.2d005c0b33f3
33
Id.
29
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individuals under the structuring absent the minimum cash requirement.
Part II of this comment provides a brief overview of what money
laundering is and examines the current state of the structuring laws under
the Bank Secrecy Act. This section also examines how the enactment of
the 1986 Money Laundering Control Act, the 1994 United States v. Ratzlaf
decision, and how Congress reacted to Ratzlaf shaped the current
structuring provisions. Part III discusses the cash hoard defense in broad
terms, its failed uses in the Van Allen and Sweeney, and how these cases set
the stage for the United States v. Sperrazza decision. Part III provides an
in-depth explanation of the Sperrazza majority and dissenting opinions.
Part IV argues why the Sperrazza dissent accurately addresses the cash
hoard issue. This section also highlights how the Sperrazza decision
implicates the rule of lenity, the decision’s policy implications, argues for
legislative action in addressing the cash hoard issue, and recommends how
the statute should be amended. Part V concludes by re-introducing the
issue, summarizing the argument, and re-highlighting the propose fix to the
current structuring statute.
II. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF MONEY LAUNDERING
Money Laundering is the process of legitimizing money that comes
from illegitimate sources.34 Money laundering has three different phases:
(1) placement, which refers to the introduction of the “dirty money” into
financial institutions, (2) layering, which refers to concealing the source of
that money through complex transactions, and (3) integration, which refers
to placing the money back into the market as if it were from legitimate
sources.35 Typically, but not always, the money comes from criminal
activity.36 Individuals who intend to evade taxes and conceal the source of
their funds could be guilty of money laundering.37

34

Investopedia,
Money
Laundering,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/moneylaundering.asp(last visited Nov. 16, 2018);
see also INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE ASSOCIATION, https://www.int-comp.org/careers/acareer-in-aml/what-is-money-laundering/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2019) (Money laundering is
the generic term used to describe the process by which criminals disguise the original
ownership and control of the proceeds of criminal conduct by making such proceeds appear
to have derived from a legitimate source.” . . . “There are two key elements to a money
laundering offence: [t]he necessary act of laundering itself” and “a requisite degree of
knowledge or suspicion (either subjective or objective) relating to the source of the funds or
the conduct of a client.).
35
Investopedia,
Money
Laundering,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/moneylaundering.asp (last visited Nov. 16, 2018).
36
Id.
37
Anthony Verni, Money Laundering Is Tax Evasion, VERNI TAX LAW. (Feb. 25,
2016), https://www.vernitaxlaw.com/money-laundering-is-tax-evasion/.
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A. The Financial Recordkeeping and Reporting of Currency and
Foreign Transactions Act of 1970 (“Bank Secrecy Act” or
“BSA”)
The Financial Recordkeeping and Reporting of Currency and Foreign
Transactions Act is commonly known as the BSA.38 The BSA requires
United States’ financial institutions to maintain records and file reports on
currency transactions and financial institutions’ customer relationships.39
Another purpose of the BSA is to use the reporting and recordkeeping
requirements to investigate and uncover criminal, tax, and regulatory
violations.40 The reporting and recordkeeping requirements were also used
to conduct intelligence and counterintelligence measures and to fight
against international terrorism.41 Congressional findings also suggests the
global war on terrorism and stopping terrorist financing was a policy
priority.42 Another purpose was to combat criminal, tax, and regulatory
violations.43 Using the reports to prosecute money laundering and other
financial crimes was another goal of the BSA.44
The BSA also requires individuals, banks, and other financial
institutions to file currency transaction reports (“CTRs”) and Suspicious
Activity Reports (“SARs”) with the United States Department of
Treasury.45 These reports are used to identify individuals who may be
subject to the criminal, tax, and terrorism enforcement actions.46 The main
use of the CTRs has been to help track large amounts of cash generated by
individuals and entities used for illegal purposes.47 The SARs are used by
financial institutions to report identified or potentially illegal activities.48
In sum while CTRs are used to identify individuals, SARs have been used
to identify the activities in which these individuals engage.49
The BSA consists of two main parts: Title I which requires financial
recordkeeping and Title II which requires reports of currency and foreign

38

Financial Recordkeeping and Reporting of Currency and Foreign Transactions of
1970, 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (1970).
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, BANKING SECRECY ACT
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING EXAMINATION MANUAL (2014).
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, BANK SECRECY ACT, ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING, AND OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL SAFETY MANUAL, (2004).
48
Id.
49
Id.
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transactions.50 The BSA regulations clarified that financial institutions,
banks, and other individuals were only obligated to file CTRs if the
“currency or other monetary instruments in an aggregate amount
exceed[ed] $10,000 at one time.”51 The BSA generally defines financial
institutions as banks, credit unions, private bankers, and investment
companies.52 Though the BSA does not provide a specific definitional
section for individuals within reporting requirements, these individuals are
grouped as financial agencies.53 A financial agent means exactly what one
might think, a person acting as an agent of any one of the financial
institutions listed within the BSA.54 The reporting and recordkeeping
requirements applies to both transactions involving United States
currencies55 and foreign currencies.56
Over the years, the BSA has been amended several times through
different acts including: (1) the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986;
(2) Annuzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1992; (3) Money
Laundering Suppression Act of 1994; (4) Money Laundering and Financial
Crimes Strategy Act of 1998; and (5) the Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act better known as the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.57
Of relevance is the Money Laundering Control Act, which produced the
current anti-structuring provisions that this comment examines.
B. The Birth of the Money Laundering Control Act (“MLCA”) of
1986
Following the enactment of the BSA, there was a prolonged period
with minimal enforcement actions for BSA violators.58 Things changed
after the Bank of Boston was fined $500,000 for violations of the BSA’s
50

Id.
31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (1987).
52
31 U.S.C. § 5312 (1970).
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
31 U.S.C. § 5313 (1970).
56
31 U.S.C. § 5314 (1970).
57
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, BANK SECRECY ACT, ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING, AND OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL SAFETY MANUAL, (2004); see
also Linn, supra note 9, at 441-44 (“In 1992 Congress amended § 5324(a) to make it a
crime to structure financial transactions to evade the reporting and recordkeeping
requirement relating to the cash purchase of cashier’s checks and similar instruments in
amounts of $ 3000 or greater. In 2001, Congress expanded the reach of § 5324(a) again by
prohibiting structuring to evade the recordkeeping requirement relating to wire transfers in
amounts of $ 3000 and greater.”).
58
Linn, supra note 9, at 407 (“After a prolonged period of inaction that lasted well
into the 1980s, financial institutions complied with the BSA’s requirements by sending
ever-increasing numbers of reports to the government.”).
51
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reporting requirements.59 In United States v. Bank of New England,60 the
Bank of Boston was fined because it exempted a known criminal
organization from CTR filing requirements. In the case, the First Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s jury instructions, which allowed
the jury to find the bank criminally liable.61 The jury concluded because
some bank employees had sufficient knowledge of the reporting
requirements vis-à-vis the theory of respondent superior, the bank could
also be criminally liable.62
In Bank of New England, a customer visited a branch of the Bank of
New England several times a month to withdraw large sums of cash from
various corporate accounts.63 During thirty one independent visits, the
customer requested blank checks from the cashier and then made those
checks payable as cash in amounts between $5,000 and $9,000, all less than
the BSA’s $10,000 requirement.64 The bank did not file currency
transaction reports on any of these transactions until it received a grand
jury subpoena.65
On appeal, the bank argued lack of notice, alleging the statute did not
specify that there would be criminal culpability for failure to file CTRs,
especially for customers who used checks.66 The bank also argued lack of
intent, alleging it did not willfully fail to file CTRs.67 The court rejected the
notice argument, holding the language of the regulation gave the bank
“adequate warning that a single, lump-sum transfer of cashing exceeding
$10,000 was reportable” and that the customer’s recurring practice should
have given the “bank fair warning that [defendant’s] transactions were
reportable.”68 The court ultimately held the bank willfully failed to file
CTRs because the aggregate knowledge of the particular operation was
sufficient, thereby rejecting the bank’s lack of intent argument.69

59

United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1987).
Id.
61
Id. at 857.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 848.
64
Id. (“[Defendant] withdrew from the Prudential Branch of the Bank more than $
10,000 in cash by using multiple checks—each one individually under $ 10,000—presented
simultaneously to a single bank teller.”).
65
United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 848 (1st Cir. 1987).
66
Id.
67
Id. at 847.
68
Id. at 848-49.
69
Id. at 856.
60
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1. The catalyst of the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986.
The decision led to a new widespread compliance with the BSA by
financial institutions helping achieve the BSA’s goal of prosecuting money
launderers, tax evaders, and other individuals who intended to keep their
criminal, financial dealings a secret.70 In the 1980s, as a result of the
increased compliance and enforcement actions, individuals “structure[d]”
their transactions as a way around the BSA’s recordkeeping and reporting
requirements.71 While the Bank of New England case put banks on notice
of banks’ reporting requirements, two other cases ultimately led to the
enactment of the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986.72
In the 1983 Tobon-Builes case, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
held a defendant who purchased several cashier’s checks totaling
$185,2000 in cash to conceal the true origin of the funds was guilty under
18 U.S.C. § 1001.73 In its holding the court stated “the government charged
and proved that [defendant] willfully and knowingly caused financial
institutions not to report currency transactions that they had a duty to
report.”74 The defendant in Tobon-Builes went to several banks in Florida
and purchased cashier’s checks in amounts less than $10,000 while using a
variety of aliases to conceal his transactions.75 The defendant argued he
was under no legal duty to report any of his cash transactions.76 The court
rejected this argument finding it inapplicable and reasoned that the statute
does apply to individuals as well as financial institutions.77 The fact that
the defendant used false names and “his structuring of single $18,000
transactions” all showed a scheme to prevent the financial institutions from
“fulfilling [its] legal duty.”78
Contrary to the Tobon-Builes decision, the Anzalone decision held a
defendant who purchased a total of twelve checks all of which aggregated
to more than $100,000, but no single check exceeding $10,000
individually, was not criminally liable under 18 U.S.C. section 2.79 The
court held the defendant did not have fair warning or a duty to disclose.80
70

Linn, supra note 9, at 444.
Id.
72
Money Laundering Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (1986); see United States v.
Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d 1092, 1099 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Anzalone, 766 F.2d
676, 678-681 (1st Cir. 1985).
73
United States v. Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d at 1096-99 (11th Cir. 1983).
74
Id.
75
Id. at 1095.
76
Id. at 1096.
77
Id. at 1098.
78
Id.
79
United States v. Anzalone, 766 F.2d 676, 678-681 (1st Cir. 1985).
80
Id.
71
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The court further stated “nothing on the face of either the Reporting Act . . .
or . . . legislative history support[ed] the proposition that a ‘structured’
transaction by a customer constitute[ed] an [act].”81 In Anzalone, the
defendant purchased several checks together totaling over $10,000 but
never individually exceeding $10,000 on two separate occasions.82 The
defendant argued the statute was constitutionally vague and it failed to give
him proper notice.83
In accepting the defendant’s vagueness argument, the court held §
5313(a) of the statute was indeed vague because its provision relating to
“any other participant in the transaction” does not specify whether it
applies to individuals as well as to financial institutions.84 In siding with
the defendant’s notice argument, the court also held the statute “imposed
no duty on the defendant to inform the Bank of his ‘structured’ funds.”85
Prior to Anzalone and Tobon-Builes, it does not seem that there was a
united legislative voice to address the issue of structuring, but with the
Money Laundering Control Act of 198686 there was a voice. Further,
Congress’ desire to expressly reject the Anzalone holding led to the
enactment of the Money Laundering Control Act where Congress found
those who structured criminally liable.87
C. The Arrival of the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 and
How it Augmented and Amended the Bank Secrecy Act
The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 was amended by the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act in subtitle H.88 The MLCA was vital because it
substantially augmented the BSA to combat money laundering.89 One
augmentation was that the MLCA imposed and increased criminal penalties
for violations of the Bank Secrecy Act.90 Specifically, criminal culpability
81

Id.
Id. at 679.
83
Id. at 680.
84
Id. at 681.
85
United States v. Anzalone, 766 F.2d 676, 682 (1st Cir. 1985).
86
18 U.S.C. § 1956 (1986).
87
Linn, supra note 9, at 440.
88
Id.
89
John K. Villa, A Critical View of Bank and the Money Laundering Statutes, 37
CATH. U. L. REV. 489, 495 (1988) (explaining that the Money Laundering Control Act of
1986 made amendments to the BSA and added two new money laundering provisions
itself).
90
House Bill 5077; see also Villa, supra note 89 at 495 (The MLCA also added a new
section to the BSA, which is known as the ‘anti-structuring statute.’ Section 5324(1) and (2)
of the anti-structuring statute prohibit an individual from causing a financial institution
either to fail to file a required report or to file a false report. Congress presumably intended
these provisions to address the growing body of cases which have held that because the
82
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was imposed on those individuals who knowingly assisted in money
laundering or in structuring transactions to evade BSA’s requirements.91
The MLCA also enhanced the BSA by increasing the maximum civil
penalties for each violation.92 Penalties for knowingly violating the statute
are either $25,000 or the amount of the transaction not exceeding
$100,000.93 In addition, the penalty for negligently violating the statute is
$500.94 The MLCA also required financial institutions, especially banks, to
maintain comprehensive compliance programs.95
The MLCA amended the BSA with the addition of section 5324 or the
anti-structuring provision.96 Section 5324 applies primarily to financial
institutions.97 On a macro scale, section 5324 deals with actions by
individuals that adversely affect the reporting and recordkeeping
requirements of financial institutions under the BSA.98 The intent of the
MLCA was simple; make money laundering a crime and close the
structuring loophole used to evade the BSA’s recording and recordkeeping
requirements.99 The legislation was also enacted to address the perceived
non-enforcement by banking regulatory agencies and the absence of banks’
compliance programs.100
To better examine the prohibited actions, the current
version of Section 5324(a) is:
“Domestic Coin and Currency Transactions Involving
Financial Institutions.—No person shall, for the purpose of
evading the reporting requirements of section 5313(a) or
5325 or any regulation prescribed under any such section,
the reporting or recordkeeping requirements imposed by
any order issued under section 5326, or the recordkeeping

regulations promulgated under the BSA do not impose a duty on individuals to inform the
bank of a reportable transaction, such a duty cannot be imposed in a criminal prosecution
without violating the fair warning requirements of the due process clause of the fifth
amendment.).
91
FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, BANKING SECRECY ACT
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING EXAMINATION MANUAL (2014).
92
31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(1) (West Supp. 1987).
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, BANKING SECRECY ACT
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING EXAMINATION MANUAL (2014).
96
Villa, supra note 89, at 495.
97
31 U.S.C. § 5324
98
Id.
99
House Bill 5484; see also Recommendations for Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money
Laundering Reform, American Bankers Association (Sept. 11, 2001) (on file with author).
100
Recommendations for Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering Reform,
American Bankers Association (Sept. 11, 2001) (on file with author).
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requirements imposed by any regulation prescribed under
section 21 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act or section
123 of Public Law 91–508—
(1) cause or attempt to cause a domestic financial
institution to fail to file a report required under section
5313(a) or 5325 or any regulation prescribed under any
such section, to file a report or to maintain a record
required by an order issued under section 5326, or to
maintain a record required under any regulation prescribed
under section 21 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act or
section 123 of Public Law 91–508;
(2) cause or attempt to cause a domestic financial
institution to file a report required under section 5313(a) or
5325 or any regulation prescribed under any such section,
to file a report or to maintain a record required by any
order issued under section 5326, or to maintain a record
required under any regulation prescribed under section
5326, or to maintain a record required under any regulation
prescribed under section 21 of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act or section 123 of Public Law 91–508, that
contains a material omission or misstatement of fact; or
(3) structure or assist in structuring, or attempt to
structure or assist in structuring, any transaction with one
or more domestic financial institutions.”101
At the time of the enactment of section 5324, structuring was never
formally defined nor was there a criminal penalty provision.102 Further, the
prior version of section 5324 attached a “willful” requirement to a
defendant’s mental culpability.103 After the enactment of section 5324 in
1986, there were several amendments made to the statute but none more
significant than the one following the Ratzlaf case.104
D. The Influence of Ratzlaf v. United States on the Current Version of
31 U.S.C. § 5324
In Ratzlaf, the Court was faced with the question of whether “a
defendant’s purpose to circumvent a bank’s reporting obligation suffice[s]
to sustain a conviction for ‘willfully violating’ the anti-structuring
provision?”105 In a five-four decision, the Court in Ratzlaf held that “to
101
102
103
104
105

31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(1)-(4).
Villa, supra note 89, at 496; see also Linn, supra note 9, at 444.
Linn, supra note 9 at 440.
Linn, supra note 9, at 440-41.
Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 137.
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give effect to the statutory ‘willfulness’ specification [in 31 U.S.C. § 5322],
the Government [must] prove [that the defendant] knew that the structuring
he undertook was unlawful.”106 Another interpretation of the Court’s
holding was that the government must prove both that the defendant knew
of the bank’s duty to report cash transactions exceeding $10,000 and that
failure to do so was a crime.107
In Ratzlaf, the defendant attempted to evade the bank’s reporting
requirements by purchasing individual cashier’s checks, each less than
$10,000, from his total poker earnings of $100,000.108 As a result, the
defendant was charged with structuring in violation of the reporting
provisions under 31 U.S.C. §§ 5322(a) and 5324(3).109 On appeal to the
Court, the defendant argued that he could not be convicted under the law’s
“willful” requirement because he was unaware that structuring was a
crime.110 The Court held even though the defendant admitted to structuring
his cash transactions, congressional intent of “willfulness” mandated that
the defendant’s knew of the bank’s reporting requirements and knew that
structuring was a crime.111 In concluding, the Court stated its decision does
not “dishonor the venerable principle that ignorance of the law generally is
no defense,”112 but echoed that “had congress wished to dispense of the
[willfulness] requirement” it would have done so.113
Congress reacted to the Ratzlaf decision quickly and within ten
months Congress superseded the ruling by statute.114 Congress amended
section 5324 by deleting the statutory requirement of “willfulness” for all
criminal prosecutions asserted under 31 U.S.C. § 5324.115 Under what
became known as the “Ratzlaf fix,” prosecutors only have to prove that
persons accused of structuring acted with the intent to evade the reporting
requirements not that the person knew such requirements were a crime. 116
106

Id. at 138.
Id. at 142.
108
Id. at 137.
109
Id.
110
Id. at 138.
111
Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 146-47 (1994).
112
Id. at 149.
113
Id. at 146.
114
Linn, supra note 9, at 447.
115
See Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-325, Sec. 411, 108 Stat. 2160, 2253 (amending Section 5324 to include its
own criminal penalty provision, now codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5324(c)).
116
U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL 2001-2009 (2018); see also
Linn, supra note 9, at 447 (First, Congress amended 31 U.S.C. § 5322 to add a clause
exempting violations of § 5324 from that statute’s reach. Second, Congress wrote a criminal
penalty provision directly into § 5324 that omitted the willfulness requirement. Taken
together, these amendments eliminated the basis on which the Supreme Court in Ratzlaf had
107
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This helped clarified the intent question and we now turn to the issue of
necessitating the minimum cash requirement in prosecutorial decisionmaking.
III. THE “CASH HOARD” DEFENSE AND ITS FAILED USES IN THE
SPERRAZZA PREDECESSORS: VAN ALLEN AND SWEENEY
One way a prosecutor proves a defendant has structured funds is to
show that the defendant had a cash hoard exceeding $10,000.117 Typically
in a case where the government prosecutes an individual who lacks the
requisite $10,000 amount, the government usually proves intent based on
either the pattern of deposits or with other evidence.118 The “cash hoard”
issue comes into play because the defendant usually argues that because
they lack the minimum cash, the prosecution should be barred from
pursuing a case against them.119 In the structuring context, the rejection of
the cash-hoard defense in United States v. Van Allen and United States v.
Sweeney set the stage for a troubling rejection of the cash hoard defense in
United States v. Sperrazza.
A. The Predecessors: United States v. Van Allen and United States v.
Sweeney
In 2008, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Van
Allen held there was sufficient evidence to find a defendant criminally
liable for structuring under 31 U.S.C. § 5324 based on a pattern of
deposits.120 In Van Allen, the defendant was an auto-parts businessman
who in a span of two years deposited more than 3,000 checks totaling over
$5.8 million with none of the checks exceeding $10,000.121 When
questioned by the FBI, the defendant explained that his patterns of
transactions were “to ‘avoid the aggravation’ of filing extra paperwork”.122
At some point prior to his indictment, the defendant filed for bankruptcy
and failed to disclose many of his financial assets as well as the money
earned by his auto-parts business during the two years he made the check

read the statute to require proof that a defendant knew structuring was a crime.).
117
Linn, supra note 9 at 462-63. See, e.g., United States v. Davenport, 929 F. 2d 1169
(7th Cir. 1991).
118
Id. at 465-47; see also Courtney J. Linn, United States v. Sperrazza: An Appropriate
Use of Federal Asset Forfeiture as Criminal Punishment, (March 18, 2016), https://s3.useast-2.amazonaws.com/washlegaluploads/upload/legalstudies/legalbackgrounder/031816LB_Linn.pdf
119
Blanch Law Firm, supra note 23.
120
United States v. Van Allen, 524 F.3d 814, 820 (7th Cir. 2008).
121
Id. at 818.
122
Id. at 817.
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deposits.123 The defendant was eventually indicted on several counts
including violations of the anti-structuring provision under 31 U.S.C. §
5324(a)(3).124
The defendant made two arguments in his defense: lack of evidence
by the government125 and failure by the government to meet its burden of
proof.126 The defendant argued “the only method of proving structuring is
to demonstrate[] that [he] held a unitary cash hoard [of] over $10,000.”127
In rejecting the defendant’s argument, the court held that the regulations
intended for any transaction seeking to evade CTRs would be a violation of
the law regardless of whether it involved amounts over $10,000.128 Though
the court recognized its decision could punish small businesses dealing
primarily in small amounts of cash under $10,000, the court fell short of
accepting those repercussions.129
In 2010, two years after the Van Allen decision, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals considered a similar “cash hoard” argument by
defendants in United States v. Sweeney.130 In Sweeney, the Eighth Circuit
held the defendants were criminally liable for structuring under 31 U.S.C. §
5324 because the defendants knew about the reporting requirements and
acted in a way to evade those reporting requirements.131 The indictment in
Sweeney alleged that, in order to purchase a car, the defendant illegally
structured $22,263.22 in cash by breaking up into varying amounts of
$9,900 and other amounts less than the $10,000.132 The car dealer and bank
tellers testified at trial that the defendants knew of the reporting
requirements.133 The defendants were subsequently found guilty of
structuring offenses relating to the car purchases.134

123

Id. at 818.
Id.
125
Id. at 819.
126
United States v. Van Allen, 524 F.3d 814, 820 (7th Cir. 2008).
127
Id. (“Primarily relying on United States v. Davenport, 929 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir.
1991), [defendant] argues that the only method of proving structuring is to demonstrate that
a defendant held a unitary cash hoard over $ 10,000 and then broke it up to deposit in
amounts under $ 10,000.).
128
Id. at 821.
129
Id. (finding that because the defendant moved over $5 million in the two years
which he could not prove a legitimate business purpose for, “the fear raised” by the
defendant did not apply.).
130
United States v. Sweeney, 611 F.3d 459, 472 (8th Cir. 2010).
131
Sweeney, 611 F.3d at 472.
132
Id. at 464-65.
133
Id.at 465.
134
Id.
124
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The defendants made two structuring related defenses.135 First, the
defendants argued the car purchase and bank withdrawal were not
transactions recognized under the 31 U.S.C. § 5324(c)(3).136 Second, the
defendants argued “break[ing] up a single cash transaction” above the
$10,000 reporting requirement “into two or more separate transactions”
was the only way to charge defendants with a structuring violation.137
Relying on Van Allen, defendants argued prosecutors failed to show that a
single transaction that exceeded $10,000 was broken up into smaller
amounts.138 The Eight Circuit like Van Allen rejected the defendants’
argument, holding that the cash hoard theory was a sufficient but not
necessary ground for prosecution.139 The court refused to narrowly
interpret the statute citing the regulations’ expansive interpretation just as
Van Allen did.140 The Sweeney court’s rejection of the cash hoard argument
seemingly set the stage for United States v. Sperrazza five years later in
2015.
B. United States v. Sperrazza: The Majority
In 2015, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a conviction
on tax evasion and structuring and held the “government may properly
charge a defendant with structuring a transaction” under 31 U.S.C. §
5324(a)(3) even if the defendant does not have more than $10,000.”141 In
Sperrazza, the defendant as part of his practice outsourced his billing
operations to a management firm.142 In return, the firm collected payments
from Dr. Sperrazza’s patients and mailed Dr. Sperrazza checks every
week.143 Approximately every ten days Dr. Sperrazza cashed about twenty
to fifty of these checks per visit.144 The checks the defendant cashed often
totaled more than $9,000 dollars but none ever exceeded $10,000.145 After
law enforcement searched defendant’s home on an unrelated criminal
investigation, an envelope labeled “clean” with about $24,000 in cash was

135

Id. 470-71.
United States v. Sweeney, 611 F.3d 459, 470-71 (8th Cir. 2010).
137
Id.
138
Id. at 471.
139
Id.
140
Id. (“The regulations explain that ‘[i]n any manner’ includes, but is not limited to,
the breaking down of a single sum of currency exceeding $ 10,000 into smaller sums . . . or
the conduct of a transaction, or series of currency transactions, including transactions at or
below $ 10,000.’”).
141
United States v. Sperrazza, 804 F.3d 1113, 1125 (11th Cir. 2015).
142
Sperrazza, 804 F.3d at 1117.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id.
136
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discovered.146 One of Dr. Sperrazza’s partners also admitted that Dr.
Sperrazza told them he never cashed checks more than $10,000 because he
wanted to avoid reports and IRS authorities.147 As a result, Dr. Sperrazza
was convicted on five counts of tax evasion and structuring under 31
U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3).148
On appeal, the defendant made several arguments including that the
structuring charges failed to state an offense and was therefore factually
inaccurate.149 Sperrazza, like the defendants in Van Allen and Sweeney,
argued there was no violation of the statute because it does not “allege he
has a ‘cash hoard’ in excess of $10,000.”150 The court rejected this
argument and cited both Van Allen and Sweeney, reasoning that the cashhoard requirement was not necessary to uphold a structuring conviction and
that Dr. Sperrazza presented no contrary authority.151
Dr. Sperrazza’s arguments were based on the Ratzlaf decision where
the defendant there argued the need for a sum of money larger than
$10,000 to be convicted of structuring.152 Like Sperrazza, the Ratzlaf Court
also rejected this argument.153 The court also dismissed the dissent’s
argument, that there needs to be at least $10,000 for a structuring charge,
and highlighted two hypotheticals to support their argument. The
hypotheticals are as follows:
First, consider a defendant who has checks totaling
$18,000 but decides to cash $9,000 today and $9,000
tomorrow in order to avoid the reporting requirement;
there can be no question the defendant may be charged
with one count of structuring in violation of § 5324(a)(3).
Second, consider the defendant who has checks totaling
$9,000 and knows he will receive another bundle of checks
totaling more than $1,000 tomorrow; in order to avoid the
reporting requirement, he decides to cash the checks
totaling $9,000 today. We think the Government may
charge the defendant in the second example with one count
146

Id.
United States v. Sperrazza, 804 F.3d 1113, 1117 (11th Cir. 2015).
148
Id.
149
Id. at 1118.
150
Id. at 1121.
151
Id. at 1122 (citing United States v. Sweeney, 611 F.3d 459, 470 (8th Cir. 2010);
United States v. Van Allen, 524 F.3d 814, 821 (7th Cir. 2008) the court noted “We have
never held all the transactions that make up a single count of structuring must have
originated from a single cash hoard, and Sperrazza has not pointed to any case endorsing
that rule. To the contrary, two circuits have expressly rejected the contention.”)).
152
Id. at 1123.
153
United States v. Sperrazza, 804 F.3d 1113, 1123 (11th Cir. 2015).
147
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of structuring even though he did not have more than
$10,000 in hand at any one time.154
In the end, the majority dismissed the dissent’s argument and held Dr.
Sperrazza was still guilty of structuring.
C. United States v. Sperrazza: The Dissent
In Sperrazza, Judge Rosenbaum’s dissent could be summed into one
statement: the defendant needs to have control of at least $10,000 before a
structuring charge can be brought under 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3).155 Though
the dissenting opinion does ultimately agree with the majority’s outcome, it
does not agree with its reasoning.156 The dissent argues the majority’s
decision punishes someone who “goes to the bank too often.”157 Judge
Rosenbaum further states the implications of the majority’s decision
punishes someone for structuring no matter how small an amount of money
that was controlled and this is not in line with congressional intent.158 In
the dissent, Judge Rosenbaum cites that neither congressional intent nor the
regulations support the majority’s opinion.159 Judge Rosenbaum also
declared that the Van Allen and Sweeney cases were unpersuasive.160
In arguing that the majority’s decision deviates from congressional
intent, Judge Rosenbaum concluded that the statutory language of the
structuring statute warrants transactions greater than $10,000.161 Using the
Senate Report accompanying the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986,
Judge Rosenbaum maintained that there was no intention to include
transactions not totaling $10,000.162
Ultimately Judge Rosenbaum
completed her congressional intent analysis by highlighting that the
commentary surrounding the statute clearly does not aim to punish
154
Id. at 1124 (explaining that the dissent’s argument that the defendant needs
“control” of at least $10,000 was errant).
155
Id.
156
Id. at 1136 (Though I respectfully disagree with the Court’s broad construction of §
5324(a)(3), I agree with the Court that the government nonetheless presented sufficient
evidence to sustain a structuring conviction in this case under the definition of “structuring”
that Congress intended. In fact, I would uphold conviction on two counts of structuring.).
157
Id. at 1129.
158
Id. (As a result of today’s ruling, in this Circuit, no matter how small a sum of
money a person may possess or otherwise enjoy a right to control—even if only a few
dollars—he may find himself facing structuring charges if he goes to the bank often enough
to create the appearance to the government of engaging in a pattern of financial transactions
of $10,000 or less. I suppose that we will discover in the coming years how frequent a bank
visitor one must be to imperil himself, but, in any case, it is clear today that § 5324(a)(3) has
taken on a far broader reach than Congress ever intended.).
159
United States v. Sperrazza, 804 F.3d 1113, 1129-32 (11th Cir. 2015).
160
Id. at 1134.
161
Id. at 1130.
162
Id. at 1131 (citing S. REP. NO. 99-433, at 22 (1986)).
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someone who does not control at least $10,000.163
In examining whether the regulations supported the majority, Judge
Rosenbaum echoed the commentary of the Department of Treasury
regulation.164 The dissent noted the statute was intended to address two
issues: (1) financial institutions must report transactions involving at least
$10,000 and (2) there to be a reportable sum of money.165 Judge
Rosenbaum’s critique here characterizes the majority’s interpretation as
overly broad and explains that the majority’s reading of the statute conflicts
with congressional intent.166 In assessing Van Allen and Sweeney, Judge
Rosenbaum expresses that neither of those decisions engaged in a deep
analysis of statutory language or congressional intent but merely predicated
their decisions on a statutory interpretation those courts developed
themselves.167
IV. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This section of the comment explains why the Sperrazza dissent
accurately addresses the cash-hoard issue and analyzes the majority’s errant
conclusion. This section also highlights how the Sperrazza decision
implicates the rule of lenity, the decision’s policy implications, the need for
legislative action in addressing the issue, and recommendations for change.
A. The Plain Language, Congressional Intent, and Rule of Lenity
The majority’s decision in Sperrazza was in error because the
statutory language is ambiguous. Accepting that the language is
ambiguous, congressional intent necessitates a finding that a defendant be
in control of the requisite $10,000 minimum.
1. The Statutory Language is Ambiguous
The majority deviates from the plain language of the statute and
regulations because both sources consistently have the $10,000 requirement
within its text. The plain language rule allows consultation with
extratextual sources only after a court has determined the statutory
language is ambiguous.168 If the meaning of the text is plain, then no

163

Id.
Id. at 1133.
165
United States v. Sperrazza, 804 F.3d 1113, 1133 (11th Cir. 2015).
166
Id. at 1134.
167
Id.
168
Matthew J. Hertko, Statutory Interpretation in Illinois: Abandoning the Plain
Meaning Rule for an Extratextual Approach, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 377, 379 (2005).
164
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outside information is allowed.169 Even the Court in Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Hill, has stated “when confronted with a statute which is plain
and unambiguous on its face, we ordinarily do not look to legislative
history to guide its meaning.”170 Often the rule is invoked when courts
want to prohibit reliance on a specific type of outside source.171 These
outside sources include legislative history, policy considerations, practice,
and other substantive cannons.172 The plain language rule does not
categorically aim to excuse the use of outside sources, but rather to make
these sources irrelevant because the statute’s language is plain.173
Using the principles from statutory interpretation, the structuring
statute will be analyzed. The pertinent part the structuring provision under
the regulation states structuring involves but is not limited to:
the breaking down of a single sum of currency
exceeding $10,000 into smaller sums, including sums at or
below $10,000 or the conduct of a transaction or series of
currency transactions at or below $10,000. The transaction
or transactions need not exceed the $10,000 reporting
threshold at any single financial institution any single day
in order to constitute structuring within the meaning of this
definition.174
The $10,000 requirement is seen four times in the short provision of
the regulations discussing what structuring means.175 The statutory
provision under 31 U.S.C. section 5324 does not specify a dollar amount
needed to structure.176 The language of the statute under subsection (a)(3)
states it is a crime to “structure or assist in structuring, or attempt to
structure or assist in structuring, any transaction with one or more domestic
financial institutions,” providing no guidance of whether the individual
must possess the $10,000 requirement. 177
The definitional provision under 31 U.S.C. section 5312 also does not
provide guidance as to whether an individual needs to have control of at
least $10,000 as a condition for structuring, thereby making the language of
the statute even more ambiguous.178 The only mention of any dollar
169
William Baude & Ryan D. Doerfler, The (Not So) Plain Meaning Rule, 84 U. CHI.
L. REV. 539, 540 (2017).
170
Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 n. 29 (1978).
171
Baude, supra note 169, at 543.
172
Baude, supra note 169 at 543–46.
173
Baude, supra note 169 at 545.
174
31 C.F.R. § 1010.100 (2018); see also 31. U.S.C. § 5324(a).
175
See Id. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100 (2018).
176
31 U.S.C. § 53249(a).
177
Id.
178
31 U.S.C. § 5312.
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amount under the definitional section pertains to requiring casinos with a
revenue of more than $1,000,000 to file transaction reports.179 A further
analysis of the statute shows it is subject to differing interpretations.180 On
one hand, the consistent mention of $10,000 throughout the language of the
regulation strongly suggests it is a requirement, especially considering the
“exceeding $10,000” language.181 On the other hand, the words “but is not
limited to” also suggest that the individual may not necessarily be required
to have at least $10,000 in hand when structuring.182 The prefatory term
“but is not limited to” typically means a list of non-exhaustive examples183
so it is entirely possible that the $10,000 requirement is not mandatory.
These two possible interpretations strongly suggest that the statute may be
ambiguous, and though the dissent never expressly says so, it can be
inferred from that opinion.184
The dissent argues the breaking down or “split[ing] up” requirements
of the statute mean the individual must possess an amount greater than or at
least $10,000.185 The dissent used the dictionary definition of “splitting up”
to argue that the person needs to have control of more than $10,000 before
one can structure the transaction in the legal sense.186 The dissent notes the
minimum $10,000 cash requirement is embedded in the statute as the
statute also requires that there is at least $10,000.01 before a bank must file
a transaction report.187 Though the dissent’s conclusion and reasoning are
sound, the dissent at times over-relies on congressional intent without
clearly expressing what that intent is.188
2. Congressional Intent is Needed
The dissent expressed that Congress did not intend for the antistructuring statute to cover transactions where the person did not control at
least $10,000.189 In examining congressional intent, the dissent highlighted
179

Id.
31 C.F.R. § 101.100 (2018).
181
Id.
182
Id.
183
Ken Adams, An Update on “Including But Not Limited To”, Adams on Contract
Drafting, (Sep. 14. 2015), https://www.adamsdrafting.com/an-update-on-including-but-notlimited-to/.
184
United States v. Sperrazza, 804 F.3d 1113, 1130 (11th Cir. 2015).
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Id.
188
Id. at 1131 (dissent notes “[E]ven to the extent that § 5324(c)(3) may be viewed as
ambiguous . . . the legislative intent is perfectly clear.”).
189
Sperrazza, 804 F.3d at 1130 (“I respectfully disagree with the Majority’s approach.
This interpretation does not account for the phrase splitting up an amount of currency that
would not be reportable if the full amount were involved in a single transaction[.] . . . The
180
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an example discussed by the Senate report discussing that a person who
converted $18,000 into smaller amounts will be guilty of structuring,
suggesting that the person needs possession of more than $10,000.190 The
dissent also notes the example in the Senate report where a person who
breaks down $2,000 into four transactions of $500 was not subject to
liability under the law, thereby bolstering the $10,000 possession
argument.191 Primarily, the dissent here argues the $10,000 requirement is
needed at the outset of the conduct not at the endpoint as the majority
errantly held.192
The commentary from the Senate report also strongly suggests that
Congress intended that before a person be charged with structuring, the
person must have control of at least $10,000.193 Remarks from Mr. Keating
II, then Assistant Secretary of Enforcement at the Department of Treasury
notes that “this bill would prohibit structuring of currency transactions to
avoid the $10,000 currency transactions reporting requirement.”194 The
Assistant Secretary even reported that he would not favor lowering the
$10,000 limit for filing CTRs.195 The commentary alone seems insufficient
to reach the conclusion that an individual needs control of the $10,000
minimum requirement. However, when coupled with the Senate Report
cited in Sperrazza’s dissent, it can be reasonably inferred that without the
$10,000 requirement there is no prosecution possible.196

phrase lays bare congressional intent that a person necessarily controls a hoard of more than
$10,000 before she can structure transactions. To “split” means “[t]o separate . . .;
disunite.” . . . A person cannot disunite something that does not yet exist. Instead, as the two
examples in the commentary illustrate—one involving the splitting up of $18,000 into two
transactions of $9,000 each and the other involving the splitting up of $2,000 into four
transactions of $500 each—a united whole must first exist before it can be disunited. We are
not at liberty to construe the statute more broadly than it was written and then we know
Congress intended. But that is what the Court’s opinion does today in holding that a person
may violate , even if he lacks control over more than $10,000.”). Judge Rosenbaum in her
dissent argued that Congress did not intend for the anti-structuring statute to cover
transactions where the person did not have control of at least $10,000.
190
United States v. Sperrazza, 804 F.3d 1113, 1131 (11th Cir. 2015).
191
Id. (citing S. Rep. No. 99-433, 22 (1986).
192
Id.
193
Id.
194
Assistant Secretary Keating II commented that the bill would specifically prohibit
structuring transactions to avoid the $10,000 reporting requirement, The Drug Money
Seizure Act and The Bank Secrecy Act Amendments: Hearing Before The Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1986).
195
Id. (noting that Assistant Treasury Secretary John K. Walker, Jr. and Assistant
Secretary Francis A. Keating II reported to Congress that they would not favor lowering the
$10,000 but rather would urge compliance with existing laws and regulations to encourage
coordination between the government and financial institutions).
196
Sperrazza, 804 F.3d at 1132.
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3. Rule of Lenity Favors the $10,000 Requirement
The rule of lenity allows an ambiguous criminal statute to be read in
favor of the defendant.197 The rule rests on various assumptions: (1) only
Congress may legitimately define crime; (2) there is a fair warning
requirement of legal or illegal behavior an accused must know before the
accused may be criminally punished; and, (3) criminal statutes should be
construed narrowly to counter risks of prosecutorial overreach.198 The late
Justice Scalia described the rule of lenity arising when there is a tie in the
interpretation of an ambiguous criminal statute, the defendant must win that
tie.199 Justice Scalia argued Due Process would prohibit holding citizens
accountable for violating a statute “whose commands are uncertain or
subjected to punishment that is not clearly prescribed.”200
i. Brief History on Lenity
The rule of lenity originates in old English criminal law which
shielded clergy members from criminal liability.201 During the middle
ages, it was known as the “benefit of clergy” rule, because clergymen were
afforded certain benefits.202 For example, it allowed clergymen to avoid the
death penalty.203 By the end of the thirteenth century the rule applied to all
major crimes not only felonies.204 Over the next two centuries, the rule not
only benefitted clergy but also benefited any individual who could read.205
Given the severity of the death penalty for petty crimes and its effect on
197

Bouvier Law Dictionary Lenity (Rule of Lenity).
Sanford Greenberg, Who Says It’s a Crime?: Chevron Deference to Agency
Interpretations of Regulatory Statutes that Creates Criminal Liability, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 1,
3; 15 (1996) (“The lenity doctrine has a three-part rationale: legislative supremacy, the idea
that only Congress has the authority to define behavior subject to criminal sanction; fair
warning; and separation of powers.”).
199
This case, now overturned by statute, presented to the Court about whether the word
“proceeds” in the Money Laundering Control Act or 18 U.S.C. § 1956 should be interpreted
broadly to mean “receipts”. While the plurality opinion by Justice Scalia stated it did,
Congress shortly amended the statute in 2009 to define proceeds as “gross receipts”. The
Santos case will be used solely to highlight Justice Scalia’s definition and discussion of the
rule of lenity not to discuss the majority’s decision; United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507,
514 (2008).
200
Id.
201
Phillip M. Spector, The Sentencing Rule of Lenity, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 511, 514-15
(2002).
202
Id. at 514.
203
Id. at 515 (discussing that all felonies in the Middle Ages were punishable by
death.).
204
Id.
205
Id.
198
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petty criminals, judges narrowly construed criminal statutes.206 It is worth
noting that the rule’s past application in earlier British time was limited to
sentencing, but its application in American tradition was much broader.207
In America, the rule was first invoked in United States v. Sheldon
where the Court refused to apply a statute criminalizing the transportation
of articles of provision from United States to Canada to a defendant who
herded oxen.208 The Court in Sheldon warned against interpreting criminal
law by equity so as to extend it to cases that are not within the statute’s
ordinary meaning.209 Three years later the Court invoked the lenity rule in
concluding that a federal manslaughter statute for killing on the high seas
does not apply to a defendant who killed someone while on a river.210 Even
though the Court invoked the rule in these cases, there was no clear
evidence demanding the rule’s application in sentencing case as there was
in ancient England.211 However, things changed following the 1950s when
the Court started to invoke the rule in a sentencing context.212 One of these
cases involved the Fair Labor Standards Act where the Court interpreted
this statute to impose penalties for individuals’ entire conduct not just
penalties for each violation of the statute.213 The most vibrant invocation of
the rule to sentencing cases was the United States v. R.L.C. case where the
Court needed to determine whether a juvenile should be sentenced under
the statutory maximum or under the sentencing guidelines maximum.214 In
holding that the sentencing guidelines penalty applies, the Court held that
the “rule has been applied not only to resolve issues about the substantive
scope of criminal statutes, but to answer questions about the severity of
sentencing.”215
ii. Recent SCOTUS take on Lenity
Even in recent years the Supreme Court continues to apply rule of
lenity, indicating the rule’s continued significance and acceptance as a tool
for interpretation. For example, the rule of lenity has been invoked under
the Armed Career Criminal Act which states that a defendant convicted of
being a felon in possession of a firearm will face a minimum fifteen year
term if they have three or more previous state or federal convictions for a
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215

Id. at 518.
Spector supra note 201, at 518.
United States v. Sheldon, 15 U.S. 119, 121 (1817).
Id.
United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 93 (1820).
Spector, supra note 201, at 526.
Id. at 527.
United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221-22 (1952).
United States v. R. L. C., 503 U.S. 291, 294-96 (1992).
Id. at 309.

BENJAMIN (DO NOT DELETE)

336

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

6/1/2020 1:05 PM

[Vol. 44:2

violent felony or serious drug offense.216 In 2007 and 2008, the Court
invoked the rule of lenity to eliminate a possible statutory construction of
the “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act’s sentencing
enhancement for certain gun crimes.217 In James v. United States, the Court
held that attempted burglary as defined under Florida law was a violent
felony for purposes of the ACCA.218 In Begay v. United States, the Court
held that driving under the influence was a not a “violent felony” for
purposes of the ACCA.219
Even a few terms ago, the Court considered statutory interpretation
questions where they did not expressly mention the rule of lenity, but it
discussed the implications of lenity raising concerns about prosecutorial
overreach as well examining whether the statutes had legislative support.220
In McDonnell v. United States,221 the Court unanimously held that a
governor does commit an “official act” for purposes of a federal bribery
statute even though the governor accepted loans and gifts, attended
meetings, hosted events, arranged meetings, and contacted officials. These
recent lines of cases show at the very least the Court invokes the rule of
lenity, examines its effects on ambiguous statutes, and is concerned about
the lenity implications.
iii. The Rule of Lenity in Sperrazza
In Sperrazza, the dissent argued that the rule of lenity does not
tolerate the majority’s interpretation of section 5324(a)(3) of the Bank
Secrecy Act.222 The dissent argued the rule of lenity should apply favoring
the defendant.223 The dissent notes in the presence of two interpretations,
one harsh and the other lenient, the rule of lenity should govern unless
Congress is clear.224 Ultimately, the dissent concluded the statute covers
only those transactions that originate from the defendant’s control of funds
exceeding $10,000.225 Since the language of the statute is ambiguous,
application of the rule of lenity warrants reading the statute with leniency
216

Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C § 924(e) (1984).
These two decisions have now been overturned but their lenity analysis remains
intact. See, James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S.
137 (2008).
218
James, 550 U.S. at 214.
219
Begay, 553 U.S. at 154.
220
Zachary Price, The Court after Scalia: The Rule of Lenity, SCOTUSblog, (Sept. 2,
2016),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2016/09/the-court-after-scalia-scalia-and-the-rule-oflenity/
221
McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016).
222
Sperrazza, 804 F. 3d at 1136.
223
Id.
224
Id.
225
Id.
217
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in favor of defendants.226
iv. Lenity Implications?
In Sperrazza, the rule of lenity may not have been helpful because
there was other evidence sufficient to find Dr. Sperrazza guilty of
structuring as the dissent rightfully concludes.227 However, if one were
dealing with a defendant in a case where there was significantly less
evidence of structuring, the doctrine of lenity brings several concerns to the
forefront.228 For example, there is the possibility prosecutors unfairly elect
to enforce criminal laws with an ambiguous statute such as section 5324.229
Invoking the rule also helps ensure accountability for prosecutor’s charging
decisions.230 Invoking the rule could allow charging decisions to be
reviewed more easily based on the specific definition as opposed to an
ambiguous one.231 Another way lenity will affect charging decisions is it
will make the true nature of the crime facially apparent rather than burying
some details in the conviction or plea agreement.232 Lenity also helps
ensure there is a general support for a criminal statute that is being
enforced.233 The rule ensures lawmakers will be held accountable by
exposing them to either ridicule, critic, or resistance from the law they
enact; they cannot hide from public pressure by constructing a vague
statute.234
B. The Policy Implications of the Sperrazza Majority’s Not so Plain
Meaning Interpretation
One of the major policy implications of the Sperrazza decision is
prosecutorial overreach.235 Structuring charges are usually criticized as
opening the door to prosecutorial overreach.236 In cases where the

226

Id.
Id.
228
Greenberg, supra note 198, at 19.
229
Greenberg, supra note 198, at 19; see 31 U.S.C. § 5324.
230
Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity As A Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885,
940 (2004).
231
Price, supra note 230, at 940.
232
Zachary Price, The Court after Scalia: The Rule of Lenity, SCOTUSblog, (Sept. 2,
2016),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2016/09/the-court-after-scalia-scalia-and-the-rule-oflenity/
233
Id.
234
Price, supra note 230, at 911.
235
Stewart Bishop, High Court Passes on Fla. Doc’s Deposit Structuring Appeal,
LAW360, (June 13, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/806449/high-court-passes-onfla-doc-s-deposit-structuring-appeal.
236
Post, supra note 8.
227
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defendant does not have the requisite cash hoard, two issues arise.237 First,
the government must primarily rely on a pattern of deposits which is not
always reliable to show criminal intent.238 In other words, if the
government solely relies on a pattern of transaction, this could capture
individuals who structure but lack the criminal intent.239 For cases
involving actors with a pattern of transactions resembling structuring, a thin
line between determining innocuous or felonious activity develops.240
Even though the Sperrazza majority highlighted the “innocent actor”
implication, the court in error suggested an innocent actor would not be
subject to criminal liability under its ruling.241 The court on this point
reasoned an innocent actor lacks the criminal intent needed, but does not
explain how that relieves them from being implicated within the statute.242
The court’s conclusion is not entirely true because to determine intent, the
government may need to show either direct evidence such there was in
Sperrazza or circumstantial evidence, which could be a pattern of deposits.
If the government uses solely a pattern of circumstantial evidence, then the
innocent actors described in Sperrazza could be implicated as well.
C. Why the Legislature is More Apt at Addressing the Cash Hoard
Defense
The legislature may be more apt at addressing the cash hoard defense
issue in Sperrazza as the Supreme Court has denied certiorari of
Sperrazza’s appeal.243 In an opposition brief by the United States
Government, then Solicitor General Donald Verrilli argued that based on
precedent from other appellate courts addressing the cash hoard defense,
the Sperrazza decision was in line.244 In other words, the government
237

Linn, supra note 9, at 465.
Id.
239
Id.
240
Balko, supra note 32.
241
Sperrazza, 804 F.3d at 1124.
242
Id.
243
Bishop, supra note 235.
244
Brief for the United States in Opposition at 12, On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, United States v. Sperrazza,
804 F. 3d 1113 (2016) (No. 15-966). Then Solicitor General Donald Verrilli made several
arguments including that this case and appeal were a 1) “particularly poor vehicle for
addressing petitioner’s claim because, . . . [the] petitioner on dozens of occasions
simultaneously controlled more than $10,000 in cash and checks, but deliberately ‘chose to
transact in cash amounts under $10,000’” 2) That “petitioner [did not] claim that such a
“cash hoard” requirement exist[ed]” and 3) “Here by contrast, the jury’s finding that
petitioner acted with the necessary mens rea was supported not only by evidence that he
engaged in so many cash transactions just below $10,000—yet never above that limit— but
also by petitioner’s own words: petitioner told his partner that he handled his finances in
such an unorthodox manner ‘to avoid any reports or anything that would involve . . . the
238

BENJAMIN(DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

RESTRUCTURE THE STRUCTURING LAW

6/1/2020 1:05 PM

339

argued because there was no circuit split on the issue, the Court did not
need to address it and thereby should deny Sperrazza’s petition for
certiorari.245
Based on the Court’s decision to deny certiorari, it seems the Court
has no interest at least for now to address whether an individual who never
possesses more than $10,000 could be charged with structuring under 31
U.S.C. 5324 absent direct evidence of intent.246 Therefore, the legislature is
the next logical actor for the issue. A few years ago Senators Feinstein and
Grassley proposed a bill titled: Combating Money Laundering, Terrorist
Financing, and Counterfeiting Act of 2017.247 Though the bill does not
address the cash hoard defense, it addresses other structuring provisions
within the BSA.248 The attempt by these Senators suggests that there could
be bi-partisan efforts to address money laundering issues including the
minimum cash requirement issue. Therefore, the Court’s denial of certiorari
implicitly shows the Court’s unwillingness to address the cash hoard issue
while the bi-partisan efforts in Congress shows Congress’ willingness to
make some substantive changes.
D. Recommendations
The ambiguity currently within the statute could be fixed by defining
key statutory provisions and rewriting or rephrasing some wording within
the statute. Unfortunately, similar state statutes provide no help. Below,
the necessary recommendations to the statute will be expressed including
how the statute should look given all of the concerns highlighted in
previous sections of this comment.
1. Possession Defined
First, the word possess must be defined. The statute in its current
form does not define possession or control. Therefore, dictionary
definitions and other criminal statutory provisions will inform on how to
define these terms. Possession means:
Detention and control, or the manual or ideal custody,
of any- thing which may be the subject of property, for
one’s use and enjoyment, either as owner or as the
proprietor of a qualified right in it, and either held
personally or by another who exercises it in one’s place
regulatory or IRS authorities.’” (citing Pet. App. 3a.).
245
Id.
246
Id.
247
Combating Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing, and Counterfeiting Act of 2017,
S. 1241, 115th Cong. (2017).
248
Id.
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and name.249
In the context of criminal law, possession can be either actual or
constructive possession.250 Actual possession means that an individual has
immediate and direct physical control over the item or property.251 With
the revised suggestion, in the context of the structuring provision, the
individual would need to be in either physical possession of the required
$10,000 or have at least $10,000 in that individual’s bank account which is
then withdrawn and broken up into smaller amounts to structure.
Constructive possession involves a situation where the individual does not
have direct possession of the item or property but has the intent and ability
to control such item.252
Applying the structuring provision, the individual will need to have
the intent and ability to control the required $10,000, though direct
possession of the funds is not necessary. For example, if the individual
orders an agent, be it a lawyer or financial advisor, to take the required
$10,000 and break it into smaller chunks, then the individual will also be
culpable. The issue of whether the $10,000 must be cash or securities will
not be addressed because the definitional section of the statute provides
what is a monetary instrument.253
2. The Fixer
Second, we must addressed which branch of government is in the best
position to amend the statute or at least provide immediate clarity.
Typically Congress makes necessary amendments to statutes.254 However,
the Court and government agencies can also provide guidance in
interpretations which may be useful while congressional action awaits.255 A
key solution is to amend the statute to read that one could only be charged
249

Possession, Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 2016).
Umansky Law Firm, Court Upholds Questionable Interpretation of Constructive
Possession,
https://www.thelawman.net/Press-Room/Court-Upholds-QuestionableInterpretation-of-Constructive-Possession/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2019).
251
Id.
252
Id.
253
See 31 U.S.C. § 5312 (defining monetary instruments as “(A)United States coins
and currency; (B)as the Secretary may prescribe by regulation, coins and currency of a
foreign country, travelers’ checks, bearer negotiable instruments, bearer investment
securities, bearer securities, stock on which title is passed on delivery, and similar material;
and (C)as the Secretary of the Treasury shall provide by regulation for purposes of sections
5316 and 5331, checks, drafts, notes, money orders, and other similar instruments which are
drawn on or by a foreign financial institution and are not in bearer form.”)
254
The White House, The Legislative Branch, https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-thewhite-house/the-legislative-branch/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2019) (discussing the role of
Congress in American law).
255
Supreme Court of the United States, The Court and Constitutional Interpretation,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/constitutional.aspx (last visited Apr. 5, 2019).
250
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with structuring if he or she possesses the required $10,000. Since
legislative enactment is usually a process that is not immediate, in the
interim the Department of Justice could release an opinion letter or
advisory opinion. Assuming the first two solutions fail, bringing a test case
to a lower court may also be a potential avenue to address the issue.256
3. The Old and Improved
The statutory provision relating to the $10,000
requirement in its present form reads—
the breaking down of a single sum of currency
exceeding $10,000 into smaller sums, including sums at or
below $10,000 or the conduct of a transaction or series of
currency transactions at or below $10,000. The transaction
or transactions need not exceed the $10,000 reporting
threshold at any single financial institution any single day in
order to constitute structuring within the meaning of this
definition.257
The statute in its ideal form will read—
An individual is guilty of structuring if the individual
possesses and splits up the requisite $10,000 in monetary
instruments as defined by 31 U.S.C. § 5312 of this chapter,
into smaller amounts at the onset, with the intent to cause or
attempt to cause a financial institution to fail to file a
currency transaction report, though the individual does not
need to know the consequences of the financial institution’s
failure. The transaction need not exceed the $10,000
reporting threshold at any single financial institution any
single day in order to constitute structuring within the
meaning of this definition. In a case where the individual
does not have the requisite $10,000, direct evidence must be
provided to show the individual acted with the intent to
cause or attempt to cause the financial institution to fail to
file the currency transaction report.
Therefore, the revised statute would ensure prosecutors will not solely

256

Govtrack,
Statistics
and
Historical
Comparison,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/statistics (last visited Apr. 5, 2019) (highlighting
statistics of congressional legislation introduced versus those enacted dating back to 1974).
257
31 U.S.C. § 5234.
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rely on a pattern of transactions to prosecute cases where the defendant
does not have the minimum cash requirement.
4. No Help from the States
Examining current state structuring statutes as a model for the federal
statute is not helpful because the state structuring laws are a replica of
federal law. For example, in New Jersey the structuring statute makes no
mention of a monetary amount or whether an individual need to have
control of at least $10,000.258 A reading of the New Jersey law shows that
it is almost a verbatim adoption of the federal language, so it seems that
looking to states, at least New Jersey will not be of much help.259
5. New Law to Sperrazza Facts
Would Dr. Sperrazza have been guilty under the suggested statute?
Based on the new law, Dr. Sperrazza would be still be guilty for several
reasons. First, Dr. Sperrazza has immediate physical control over the
requisite $10,000 with the intent to structure the checks to evade taxes.
Even if Dr. Sperrazza’s argues he did not have direct possession because an
outside firm handled the funds, Dr. Sperrazza still had the requisite
constructive possession.260 Further, checks are monetary instruments by the
statute’s definitional section so any argument to the contrary would be
errant.261 Applying to suggested statute to the Sperrazza facts though there
is no evidence Mr. Sperrazza’s transaction exceeded the requisite $10,000
at any single time, there will be sufficient direct evidence to find Dr.
Sperrazza culpable under the new statute. One piece of evidence was the
envelope in his home found by law enforcement labeled “clean” cash
totaling $24,000. Another piece of evidence was the testimony of
Sperrazza’s partner expressing that the doctor structured to avoid reports
and IRS authorities. Therefore, even under the revised statute Dr.
Sperrazza would be guilty.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the current language of the statute is ambiguous,
congressional intent and rules of statutory interpretation suggests that an
individual need to be in control of at least $10,000 to be charged with
structuring. The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Sperrazza, rejecting this
proposition, sweeps innocent individuals who neither intend to violate the
statute nor attempt to hide any underlying criminal conduct. The Court’s
258
259
260
261

N.J. STAT. ANN. Section 2C:21-25.
Id.
Sperrazza, 804 F.3d at 1117.
31 U.S.C. § 5312.
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decision to errantly deny certiorari does not help answer this pending
question of whether an individual could be charged for structuring solely
based on a pattern of transactions when they lack the requisite $10,000
statutory requirement. Since there is judicial silence on this issue, the
burden should now fall on Congress to attempt to provide an answer.
While not every individual who structures money and possesses less than
the $10,000 requirement is innocent, the chances of innocent individuals
being punished are too great. There soon needs to clear action from either
the legislative or judicial branch. If not, a restaurant owner who goes to the
bank every week to deposit $9,000 dollars to avoid carrying copious
amounts of cash and to avoid robbers could be guilty of a crime absent
greater evidence of intent. Even a bartender who makes about $2,000$2,500 a week in tip but never over $10,000 a month could also be guilty of
a crime. Our system of criminal justice hopefully cares enough to prevent
such charges and convictions.

